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The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of SEC
Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules
For decades, institutional investors and activist shareholders
have expressed increasing concern over lucrative compensation
packages for corporate executives, specifically those at
underperforming companies.'
Equally frustrating to many
shareholders is the method by which large corporations determine
executive compensation packages-a process rife with complexities2
and informalities,' affording management ample opportunity to
1. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance,28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 40-41 (2004); Terence O'Hara, Many Executives' Paychecks
Swelled, No Matter How They Did, WASH. POST, July 10, 2006, at D7; see also Stuart L.
Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposalsand Shareholder Activism:
The Role of InstitutionalInvestors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 284-87 (2000) (summarizing the
litany of shareholder proposals surrounding executive compensation issues in recent
years).
2. See Nell Minow & Kit Bingham, Executive Pay: Investors Care, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1992, at 22, 25 (noting that executive pay packages are often submerged in
"opaque proxy-speak"). Even sophisticated financial analysts often have difficulty
surmising the precise amounts being paid to corporate management. According to Minow
and Bingham, The Wall Street Journalonce reported that the salary of a certain CEO had
increased to $7.3 million when, in reality, the salary had increased to $11.4 million. Id.
Analysts from The Wall Street Journal had been forced to delve into nineteen pages of
dense proxy statements in order to ascertain the CEO's precise compensation. Id. at 25.
For a discussion of the debacle, see Patrick J. Straka, Comment, Executive Compensation
Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt To FacilitateMarket Forces, 72 NEB. L. REV. 803, 805-06
(1993).
3. Carol J. Loomis, 'This Stuff Is Wrong', FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 73, 74-80
(stating that "compensation committees are really in the pockets of CEOs"). The
informalities often associated with executive compensation decisions exist partially as a
result of the delegation of compensation matters to special committees charged with
determining and overseeing the pay packages extended to senior executives. See Iman
Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 848 (2004) ("[T]he CEO of a
company plays an active role in the [compensation committee] selection process. The
CEO is generally expected to recommend and discuss candidates with the nominating
committee and to recruit candidates .... [Miembers who are hand-picked by the CEO
are often senior executives at other companies or individuals who share the same worldview as the CEO. The result is that even independent directors may be predisposed
toward insiders." (footnotes omitted)); see also Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO
Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 54 J. FIN.
1829, 1851 (1999) (discussing the significant influence of CEOs and top executives on the
selection of board and committee members). Though the precise role of a corporation's
compensation committee may vary depending upon the specific delegation of authority
from the board of directors, compensation committees are typically charged with
recommending pay levels for top management, approving employment agreements, and
administering incentive-based option plans. See generally Anabtawi, supra, at 841
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significantly "influence[] the terms of their own remuneration."4 In
many cases, shareholders have difficulty even surmising the precise
amount of executive compensation because of the labyrinth of

creative compensation techniques that have been steadily evolving in
both sophistication and complexity.'
After a series of devastating and high-profile corporate scandals,6
federal regulators and lawmakers have increased their scrutiny of

executive compensation in recent years.7 In many cases, this scrutiny
has led corporate managers and directors to be more discreet,
enhancing their compensation so as to minimize adverse shareholder
reaction and circumvent pressures from the investment community.8

(discussing the shortcomings of special compensation committees in effectively controlling
executive pay packages). These special compensation committees have evolved primarily
as a result of new complexities in executive compensation and additional regulatory
requirements imposed by the SEC. See BRUCE R. ELLIG, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 510-12 (2002).

4. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 3, at 841-42 (outlining the litany of methods by
which top executives influence compensation committees). During an empirical study of
executive compensation trends, one anonymous CEO admitted that compensation
committees and nonmanagement board members were at a significant disadvantage when
overseeing matters of executive compensation. See Loomis, supra note 3, at 73-74.
Another executive posited that "[b]asically, what people understand they have to do is go
along with management, because if they don't they won't be part of the club. You sort of
get rolled over by the system even if you try to do well." Id. at 76; see also ELLIG, supra
note 3, at 511 (noting that the addition of independent directors on a compensation
committee may have diminishing results, as management officials are far more apt to be
versed in executive compensation techniques).
5. TED ALLEN & SUBODH MISHRA, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., AN
INVESTOR GUIDE TO THE STOCK OPTION TIMING SCANDAL 1 (2006), available at

http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/OptionTiming.pdf.
6. Corporate bankruptcies at blue-chip giants Enron, WorldCom, Qwest, and Global
Crossing spawned an era of increased awareness as to executive compensation techniques
and the manner by which executives influence the terms of their own compensation. See
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2002); Paul Krugman, For Richer:
How the Permissive Capitalism of the Boom Destroyed American Equality, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2002, (Magazine) at 62, 66.
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); JAMES HAMILTON & TED
TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002:

LAW AND EXPLANATION 13 (CCH

2002) (commenting that the public outrage stemming from the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom prompted Congress and President Bush to adopt new measures aimed at
addressing the systematic and structural deficiencies affecting American capital markets);
Christopher Wyant, Executive Certification Requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: A Case for Criminalizing Executive Recklessness, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 562
(2003) ("Collectively, this legislation is embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ....
which impacts nearly every aspect of the system that brings financial information from a
public corporation to existing and potential investors ....
8. See Anabtawi, supra note 3, at 852.
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As the backdating scandal aptly illustrates, 9 many executives have

found the opportunistic timing of option grants"0 to be "an especially
attractive way to enhance executive compensation both because it is
difficult to detect and because it has generally eluded [the] attention"
of shareholders and investment professionals.1 1

Much like the corporate scandals of the past, the practice of
backdating l equity option grants poses a serious potential problem
under federal securities law and "strikes at the heart of the
relationship among a public company's management, its directors,
and its shareholders."" Amid the widening backdating scandal, the
Securities
and Exchange Commission
("SEC")14
recently
promulgated a new set of executive compensation and related-party
disclosure rules,15 representing the most significant overhaul of
benefit disclosure policy since 1992.16
The new regulations,
9. See infra notes 25, 65 and accompanying text.
10. Equity option grants permit an executive to purchase shares of the company's
stock for a specified price at some point in the future. In theory, stock options are aimed
at aligning the interests of shareholders and management by creating a personal financial
incentive for the executive to increase shareholder value. For a general discussion of stock
option grants, see Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent
Judgment of the General Counsel-A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1, 8-10
(2005).
11. Anabtawi, supra note 3, at 852.
12. The term "backdating" has now been widely adopted among academics,
regulators, and investors as the pejorative characterization of the opportunistic timing of
option grant packages. Although "backdating" is not necessarily a term of art, it is
important to understand the practice to which the term applies. See infra notes 110-12
and accompanying text.
13. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Options Backdating:
Remarks Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States
Senate 1 (Sept. 6, 2006), http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/-files/ACFBO67.pdf.
14. The SEC operates as an independent regulatory agency within the executive
branch. See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 2 (3d
ed. 2006). The Commission is charged with the administration of federal securities
statutes and has been delegated expansive regulatory powers by Congress. See id.;
THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (5th ed., rev. 2005)
(explaining the differing types of rulemaking authority that have been conferred upon the
SEC) Although the SEC is comprised of only five commissioners serving at the pl-asure
of the President, the Commission is staffed with hundreds of lawyers and investment
analysts. The SEC is generally considered to be one of the most effective and
approachable federal agencies. See BARTOS, supra, at 254.
15. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158
(Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274).
16. Terence O'Hara, SEC Rules Tightened on Pay Disclosure;Firms Must Detail Total
Compensation of 5 Top Executives, WASH. POST, July 27, 2006, at D1. The executive
compensation disclosure rules promulgated by the SEC in 1992 provided shareholders
with standardized and plain-English disclosure of executive pay packages. See Executive
Compensation Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249 (2006). The 1992 disclosure
rules enabled "shareholders to find out in a matter of minutes what used to take hours to
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unanimously adopted by federal regulators in July of 2006, take effect

in the upcoming proxy season commencing in the spring of 2007.17
Having spawned more than 20,000 official comments, the new
executive compensation disclosure rules have generated more interest
than any other set of proposed regulations in the SEC's seventy-twoyear history. 8 The new rules are extraordinarily broad in scope,
encompassing over ninety pages of the Federal Register and tackling
a litany of issues ranging from related-party transactions 9 to tabular

disclosure requirements.20

However, this Recent Development

addresses the specific provisions of the regulations dedicated to the
disclosure of backdated equity option grants.
The backdating
disclosure provisions of the new regulations require that publicly
traded companies disclose detailed information regarding the
rationale for executive stock option plans, as well as the justification
for any potential backdating that may have occurred. 2 According to
regulators, these new disclosure rules are intended not only as a
means of enhancing corporate accountability, but also as an effort to
address the backdating scandal that has recently ignited public fury.22

However, the new executive compensation disclosure rules serve
only as a symbolic gesture, reinforcing existing federal securities laws
that already mandate the disclosure of backdated options. The
newest disclosure rules represent only a feeble-and with all
likelihood fruitless-attempt at combating the increasingly abusive
determine, namely, how much the company's CEO and other top executives reaped from
their compensation packages for the year." James E. Heard, Executive Compensation:
Perspective of the Institutional Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 752-53 (1995)
(summarizing the four major changes brought about by the 1992 executive compensation
disclosure rules).
17. Although the executive compensation disclosure rules do not officially take effect
until the spring 2007 proxy season, "certain interpretations of the existing proxy rules
contained in the [new rules] will apply to [the 2006] proxy statement." Steve Bochner,
Client Memorandum-SEC Proposes Major Overhaul of Executive Compensation
Disclosure-What You Need To Know This Year, February 2006, in ADVANCED
SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 2006, at 399, 401 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2006); see
also Cox, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that "in the next proxy season beginning in the
spring, all public companies will now report this information in clear, easy to understand
tabular presentations").
18. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes To
Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July
26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.
19. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,197.
20. Id. at 53,163.
21. SEC Adopts New Regulations on Executive Compensation, Perks, Fox NEWS, July
26, 2006, http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,205689,00.html [hereinafter SEC Adopts New
Regulations].
22. Id.
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corporate practice of backdating option grants. Moreover, by
mandating only increased disclosure of backdated options, 3 rather
than instituting a blanket prohibition of such practices, the SEC
appears to have at least tacitly accepted the legitimacy of these
deceptive, and arguably illegal, practices. 24
At the outset, this Recent Development discusses applicable
background law pertaining to the issuing of equity option packages,
including the various rationales for backdating options, the adverse
effects on shareholder value, and the extent of the widening option
timing scandal.'
Next, this Recent Development details the
backdating provisions of the executive compensation disclosure
rules 26 aimed at enhancing shareholder knowledge of manipulative
option timing practices and discusses the shortcomings of the new
regulations with regards to effectively combating the practice of
options backdating. Finally, this Recent Development will offer
guidance for future SEC action that more directly addresses the
problem of manipulative option timing.
To evaluate the merits of the SEC's newest disclosure rules, a
brief discussion of contemporary trends in option-based
compensation is in order. The issuing of an equity option grant
permits the recipient to purchase a specified number of shares of a
company's publicly traded stock at a specified strike price.
Many
option plans are limited in the scope of their exercise period or have
special vesting requirements to promote long-term incentives to

23. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,163
("[T]he Commission believes that in many circumstances the existence of a program, plan
or practice to time the grant of stock options to executives ... would be material to
investors and thus should be fully disclosed in keeping with the rules we adopt today.").
24. For a detailed discussion of the legality of backdating equity option grants, see
infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
25. During the summer and fall of 2006, the option backdating scandal quickly
became the hottest topic in federal securities law. Venerable blue-chip companies such as
Apple, Home Depot, and Barnes & Noble---each historically reputed for their impeccable
corporate governance practices-have been among those placed under the regulatory
microscope as the SEC and Justice Department continue to expand the scope of inquiries
into executive option packages at some of the Nation's largest publicly held companies.
See, e.g., Grace Wong, A Primer for Firms Hit by Stock Option Scandal, CNN MONEY,
Oct. 11, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/11/technology/options-backdating (discussing
the extent of the widening criminal and regulatory probe into improper backdating
practices).
26. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,158.
27. ELLIG, supra note 3, at 357; see also Anabtawi, supra note 3, at 840 (discussing the
logistics of equity option plans and their influence on the behavior of corporate
executives).
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corporate executives. 28 Because equity option grants inherently link

an executive's compensation to the value of the company's underlying
stock, public companies generally adopt executive stock option plans
to improve the performance of management 29 and create a

proprietary interest in the company to better align shareholder and
management interests.3 0 Properly structured equity option packages

provide top executives with "a great incentive to raise the company's
share price, which increases both the value of his or her options and
shareholder returns."31 Directors have also found that lucrative stock

option plans are the most effective means of attracting and retaining
talented executives in an increasingly competitive corporate

marketplace.32 A less apparent, though equally beneficial aspect of
adopting executive stock option plans, includes the ability to decrease
corporate tax liability33 while ensuring favorable accounting
treatment.34 Maintaining a healthy balance of equity option grants in
28. See

ELLIG, supra note 3, at 357.
29. Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 306 (1995); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J.
Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 31, 37-38 (2000).
30. Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans,
Executive Compensation,and the ProperStandard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 148 (2000);
see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 29, at 38-40 (determining that one of the primary
purposes behind equity option plans is to "provide managers and employees with a
proprietary interest in the company"). See generally Roy F. Price, Options, Waste and
Agency Costs in the Corporation,4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 391 (1995) (discussing the
economic rationale of equity option grants in executive compensation packages).
Congress has also created tax incentives aimed at encouraging corporations to use equity
option grants as a form of executive compensation. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 251(a), 95 Stat. 172, 256-59 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2000)).
Through these tax benefits, Congress recognized that properly structured equity option
plans "provide an important incentive device for corporations to attract new management
and retain the service of executives who might otherwise leave, by providing an
opportunity to acquire an interest in the business." Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of
Incentive Stock Options-Turning Employee Income into Gold, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 488,
500-01 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 98-99 (1981)).
31. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 1; see also Cox, supra note 13, at 2 ("[A]
properly structured option plan can be useful in more closely aligning the incentives of
shareholders and managers. And for growth companies, the use of stock options as
compensation offers a way to conserve resources while attracting top-flight talent in highly
competitive markets.").
32. See Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposalfor
Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 39-44
(1997); Melton, supra note 30, at 488; Thomas & Martin, supra note 29, at 37.
33. See Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments in
Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns for
Corporate Directors,3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 5, 14 (1997).
34. In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board issued Opinion 25, entitled "Accounting
for Stock Issued to Employees." ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., ACCOUNTING FOR
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executive pay packages also allows corporate directors to better
deflect shareholder allegations of excessive executive compensation.35

The disadvantages of equity option packages, however, are well
documented and widely acknowledged. By increasing the number of
outstanding shares, option grants often dilute the interests of existing
shareholders.36 Moreover, option grants with short vesting periods

can create incentives for management to focus on short-term
increases in the company's stock price while neglecting the long-term
interests of shareholders and precluding sustainable corporate
growth.3 7 Some commentators have even suggested that lucrative

equity option packages may create perverse incentives for
management to ignore federal securities laws in an effort to ensure
short-term financial results.38
In light of the competing advantages and disadvantages of equity

option packages, the SEC has explicitly elected to remain neutral on
the subject, 39 allowing equity option plans to evolve into the
centerpiece of many executive compensation packages.40 However,
"[a]s the use of options compensation has increased ... so apparently
In a feeble attempt to ensure that option plans
has its abuse.'

STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, OPINION No. 25 (1972) (superseded by SHARE-BASED
PAYMENT, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 123 (2004)). Under the provisions of Opinion 25, a company is required

to recognize a compensation expense on its income statement for any difference that may
exist between the market price of the company's stock on the date of the grant and the
option's exercise price. See id. Hence, a company need not account for equity option
expenses on corporate earnings statements unless the exercise price is less than the fair
market value of the security on the day the award is issued. See id.
35. Bank, supra note 29, at 302 ("[C]ompanies have turned more toward stock-based
compensation as a means of both preserving the deductibility of executive compensation
and placating disgruntled shareholders.").
36. JAMES HAMILTON, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RELATED-PARTY
DISCLOSURE: SEC RULES AND EXPLANATION 80 (2006).
37. Id.
38. Rajesh Aggarwal, Executive Compensation and CorporateControversy, 27 VT. L.
REV. 849, 849-50 (2003).
39. HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 79 ("The SEC does not seek to encourage or
discourage the use of stock options or, for that matter, any other particular form of
executive compensation.").
40. Anabtawi, supra note 3, at 836; see also Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: ManagerialPower Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 847, 847-48 (2002) (noting that the total compensation of CEOs during the 1990s
increased almost 300% from $2.3 million to nearly $6.5 million and that the increase
during this time period largely reflected a significant increase in the value of equity option
plans, which increased from 27% to 51% of the total executive compensation).
41. Linda Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Executive
Compensation and Options Backdating Practices: Remarks Before the Committee on
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properly align the interests of shareholders and management, most
companies structure option plans in a method that ensures an exercise
price equal to the fair market value of the underlying security on the
day that the grant is issued.42 Consequently, most companies award
option grants at-the-money,4 3 meaning that the exercise price is equal
to the fair market value of the stock on the day in which the grant is
issued." At-the-money option grants have generally been popular
with American companies because the costs of these awards are
categorized as performance-based compensation and are therefore
deductible from corporate tax returns, 45 even in cases where the
executive's annual salary exceeds one million dollars.46
Because the value of an equity option decreases as the exercise
price gets higher, executives naturally prefer that the stock price be as
low as possible on the day that the award is issued, thereby increasing
the value of their compensation.47 Option backdating takes place
when a company retroactively sets an option exercise price to an
earlier date, when the fair market value of a particular security is less
than the current trading price. s One of the earliest shareholder
derivative actions filed in the wake of the backdating scandal equated
the practice of backdating option grants with "picking lottery
numbers on the day after the winning numbers are reported in the

Finance, United States Senate 2 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony/2005test/090606testlt.pdf.
42. Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803
(2005).
43. See generally Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for
Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2002) (estimating that approximately
95% of all option grants occur at-the-money).
44. The exercise price of an option grant is generally calculated by using the stock's
closing price on the day in which the grant is awarded or by averaging the stock's high and
low trading price on the day of the grant. See ALLEN & MISHRA, supranote 5, at 1.
45. Equity options must be granted either at or above the market value of the stock
on the day that the grant is awarded to qualify as "performance based compensation"
under § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. Option grants that qualify as performance
based compensation under § 162(m) are tax deductible even in cases where the executive's
total annual compensation exceeds $1 million. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2000); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (as amended in 1996); see also Enron: Joint Committee on
Taxation Investigative Report on Compensation-Related Issues: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 75-76 (2003) (statement of Pamela Olson, Assistant
Secretary, Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury) ("[T]he 'performance-based'
exception has encouraged many companies... to shift compensation ... into stock options
and other forms of compensation tied to the company's stock price.").
46. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 1.
47. Lie, supra note 42, at 803.
48. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 1.
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news." 49 Effectively, the practice of backdating creates an "in-the-

money" option, where an executive is permitted to purchase shares of
the company's stock at a lower price than the fair market value of the
stock on the day the grant was originally awarded."
Federal regulators contend that a wide range of publicly held
companies illegally created in-the-money options by "misrepresenting

the date of the option grant, to make it appear that the grant was
made on an earlier date when the market value was lower."'" The

practice of backdating equity options involves a rare and unusually
complex "convergence of accounting, tax and securities regulation...
and carries the potential for serious civil and criminal
consequences. '52 For example, backdated in-the-money options are
not considered performance-based compensation and do not qualify
for the tax benefits or favorable accounting treatment typically
afforded to traditional, at-the-money stock option packages.53 The

rationale for disguising an in-the-money option grant by retroactively
backdating the award is to allow the executive to realize an
immediate financial windfall without having to disclose the expense
financial statements.5 4

as compensation on the company's yearly

The investment community has long speculated that directors
and corporate executives may have engaged in deceptive and

opportunistic timing of equity option grants.5

High-profile corporate

49. Complaint at 2, St. Paul Teachers' Ret. Fund Ass'n v. McGuire, No. 06-CV-01959
(D. Minn. May 18, 2006).
50. Cox, supra note 13, at 1.
51. Id.
52. Vinson & Elkins LLP, Options Backdating Update (July 26, 2006), http://www.
velaw.com/resources/resource-detail.asp?rid=000322803901&rtype=pub.
53. See id.
54. ALLEN & MISHRA, supranote 5, at 1; Cox, supra note 13, at 2.
55. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 3. See generally Keith Chauvin & Catherine
Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Priorto Executive Stock Option Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53
(2001) (speculating that executives were manipulating the timing of equity option grants);
David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997) (discussing suspicious market movements in the
immediate wake of unscheduled option grants). In addition to the practice of backdating
equity option grants, several articles have addressed the more prolific problem of
"springloading" option grants to coincide with favorable news releases. See, e.g., Stanley
Keller, Stock Option Pricing Practices Occupy Center Stage, in STOCK OPTION PRICING
PRACTICES: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 9, 12 (Stanley Keller ed., 2006) ("The grant of

options before the disclosure of material nonpublic information likely to affect favorably
the market price of a company's shares has been called 'springloading.' "); David Aboody
& Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary
Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73, 75 (2000) (providing an overview of abusive
springloading practices). One common variation of the popular practice of springloading
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scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco have all demonstrated the
potential for management to enhance the value of equity option
grants by manipulating the process by which companies award
options to executives.56 The SEC has consistently voiced concern
over option granting practices, although abusive option practices now
appear to have reached maximum proportion in the wake of the
current backdating frenzy." Indeed, Congress has attempted to stem
the tide of abusive option practices on several occasions, though the
fruits of these efforts have been largely unrealized.
Several early empirical studies indicated that option grants
tended to occur on days when the price of the underlying security was
conveniently low.59 In May of 2005, Erik Lie, a professor at the
University of Iowa, conducted a comprehensive study of nearly 6,000
equity option grants that took place between 1999 and 2002.60
Professor Lie's study found a highly pronounced pattern of
option grants is "bullet-dodging," which involves the postponement of option grants until
unfavorable corporate information has been properly addressed. See Keller, supra at 13.
56. See Stuart L. Gillan & John D. Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate
Governance and the Collapse of Enron 31 (Univ. of Del. Coll. of Bus. & Econ., Ctr. for
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 2002-002, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/soll3/papers.cfmabstractid=354040 (revisiting the corporate accounting scandals at
Enron and WorldCom); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1247 (2002) (theorizing that Enron executives, because of their
massive profits from earlier option grants, turned the corporation into a "hedge fund,
taking leveraged bets in exotic markets that if successful would produce a huge,
disproportionate bonanza for its executives").
57. Keller, supra note 55, at 11 (contending that the SEC's most recent concerns over
option granting practices has resulted from increased media attention and academic
studies that have suggested deceptive option timing practices).
58. In 2002, for example, § 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended § 16(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in an effort to reform existing reporting requirements
that accompany equity option grants. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 403, 116 Stat. 745, 788 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, directors were not required to disclose option grants until the
end of the fiscal year in which the award took place. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The
Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming June 2007) (manuscript at 7-8 n.21, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) ("Prior to [Sarbanes-Oxley], grants meeting certain requirements could be
reported ... within 45 days after the end of the company's fiscal year."). Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, instituted a real-time disclosure requirement for option awards, and shortly after
the Act's passage, the SEC promulgated new regulations requiring that directors and
officers disclose options within two business days of the award. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a)(2)(C); Cox, supra note 13, at 3 (addressing the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on
abusive option practices).
59. ALLEN & MISHRA, supranote 5, at 2; Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 55, at 53-76;
Yermack, supra note 55, at 449-76.
60. Lie, supra note 42, at 802.
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abnormally low stock prices just prior to the granting of stock options,
and unusually high stock prices during the time period immediately
following a grant package." Notably, the Lie study recognized "a
sharp decline in prices immediately before unscheduled and
unclassified awards followed
afterwards."'6
Lie posited
informational advantage that
forecasts regarding the future

by a sharp reversal immediately
that "unless executives have an
allows them to develop superior
market movements that drive these

predicted returns, the results suggest that the official grant date must
have been set retroactively."63 The results of Professor Lie's study

were groundbreaking and unleashed a firestorm of controversy in the
investment community. 64
Even prior to these contemporary studies regarding the option
timing practices of many corporations, the SEC had investigated
several isolated cases 65 of backdating option grants.66 Professor Lie's

study, however, was the first indication of a more prolific backdating
phenomenon.67 Professor Lie estimated that nearly ten percent of all
stock options granted prior to August of 2002 are tainted by the
61. See id. at 810-11.
62. Id. at 807.
63. Id. at 811. Ultimately,
[t]his prompts the question as to whether some of the awards are timed ex post
facto. That is, when the decision regarding the official award date is made, the
official award date (and, hence, the exercise price of the options) might be
determined to be an earlierdate that had a particularly low price.
Id. at 807.
64. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing recent controversies over
backdating).
65. In November 2005, for example, Mercury Interactive announced the resignation
of three top executives in the wake of investigations that uncovered forty-nine instances of
backdating and manipulating equity option grants. Rebecca Buckman et al., Mercury
Interactive Executives Resign in Wake of Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2005, at A7; see also
Cox, supra note 13, at 5-7 (noting several companies that the SEC has investigated).
Around that same time, executives from Analog Devices agreed to settle a civil suit
regarding allegations of timing irregularities in granting stock option awards. See Press
Release, Analog Devices, Analog Devices Announces Tentative Settlement of the SEC's
Previously Announced Stock Option Investigation (Nov. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.analog.com/en/press/0,2890,3_88325,00.html (discussing the elements of the
settlement whereby the company would "consent to a cease-and-desist order under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 [and] thereunder, would pay
a civil money penalty of $3 million, and would reprice options granted to Mr. Fishman and
other directors in certain years").
66. See generally Geoffrey Colvin, A Study in CEO Greed: How One Intrepid
Academic Exposed the Latest Stock Option Scandal, FORTUNE, June 12, 2006, at 53
(discussing the isolated SEC investigations that occurred prior to Professor Lie's study).
67. See id.
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specter of potential backdating,68 and Merrill Lynch has released a

similar report6 9 which surmises that forty companies in the S&P 500
manipulated the timing of option grants between 1999 and 2002.20
At the outset of the backdating scandal, questionable option
timing practices appeared

to be

concentrated

largely in the

technology sector and among smaller companies with significant stock
price volatility.7 However, more recent revelations indicate that the
backdating scandal may be far more pervasive, especially as largecap, blue-chip companies announce impending investigations into

their option timing practices.7 2 Initial estimates surmise that twentythree percent of "unscheduled, at-the-money grants to top executives
dated between 1996 and August 2002 were backdated or otherwise
manipulated."' 3 Moreover, nearly thirty percent of all firms granting
equity options to executives between 1996 and 2005 are thought to
have manipulated their grants in some fashion.74 At least sixty
companies have already acknowledged SEC or Justice Department
investigations into their option practices,75 and the SEC itself claims
to have at least 100 companies under regulatory scrutiny.76 In
corporate boardrooms, the numbers continue to climb, with eighteen
CEOs forced into resignation, over five billion dollars in corporate
profits restated, and five indictments levied against executives from
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. and Comverse Technology,

68. ALLEN & MISHRA, supranote 5, at 3; Lie, supranote 42, at 802.
69. MERRILL LYNCH, QUANTITATIVE STRATEGY UPDATE: OPTIONS PRICING FOR
THE S&P 500 (2006) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
70. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 3.
71. Erik Lie, Backdating of Executive Stock Option Grants, http://www.biz.uiowa.
edu/faculty/elie/backdating.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
72. After announcing impending investigations into the company's option timing
practices, Apple reported that internal investigations had uncovered timing irregularities
with at least fifteen option grants between 1997 and 2002, sparking a wave of derivative
actions, public apologies from CEO Steve Jobs, and the forced resignation of CFO Fred
Anderson. See Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple's Special Committee Reports Findings of
Stock Option Investigation (Oct. 4, 2006), http://apple.com/pr/library/2006/oct/04
investigation.html. Other companies, such as healthcare magnate Caremark Rx, Inc., have
taken a different approach, publicly denying allegations of improper backdating despite
the ominous presence of pending regulatory and criminal investigations. Erik Schelzig,
CEO: Caremark 'OK' in SEC Investigation, BOSTON.COM, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.
boston.com/business/technology/articles/2006/09/21/ceo-caremarkokin-sec_
investigation. For an exhaustive tabular summary of companies currently embroiled in the
backdating scandal, see Wong, supra note 25.
73. Lie, supra note 71.
74. See id.
75. SEC Adopts New Regulations, supra note 21.
76. Cox, supra note 13, at 7.
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Inc." Although experts and commentators agree that the option
backdating scandal is prolific among publicly traded companies,78 the
true scope of the scandal remains to be seen.7 9
In January of 2006, the SEC began to address the increasing
concerns of the investment and shareholder communities by unveiling
a new cache of proposed compensation disclosure rules aimed at

improving transparency and ensuring the proper use of corporate
assets. 80 But the optimism that followed the SEC's January proposals
quickly faded when The Wall Street Journal published a scathing

article questioning the wildly improbable grant patterns of several
prominent companies. 81 As the number of companies under scrutiny
continued to grow, the investment community became increasingly
adamant about the need for tighter SEC regulation.' While events
unfolded on Wall Street, large institutional investors83 and activist

shareholders began to lobby the SEC to include specific provisions in
the proposed executive compensation disclosure rules that would

address abusive backdating practices. 8'

Assuaging the concerns of

these investors, the SEC vowed to address backdating and other

option timing issues when it adopted its final executive compensation
disclosure rules.

77. Marcy Gordon, Stock Option Scandal Will Go on in '07, YAHOO NEWS, Dec. 11,
2006, http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/06121 1/ye-stockoptionsscompanies.html?.v=l.
78. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
79. Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Executive
Compensation: Backdating to the Future, Oversight of Current Issues Regarding
Executive Compensation Including Backdating of Stock Options; Tax Treatment of
Executive Compensation, Retirement and Benefits: Remarks Before the Committee on
Finance, United States Senate 8 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony/2005test/090606testpm.pdf ("[W]e cannot say at this juncture how many cases
we will ultimately investigate or what number will be more appropriately resolved as
criminal, rather than as civil matters.").
80. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 1.
81. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006,
at Al. The subsequent wave of media and shareholder scrutiny sent investors and market
observers "scrambling to identify companies with suspicious grant patterns, leading to a
rash of internal investigations, shareholder lawsuits, and, most ominously, criminal probes
by the Department of Justice." Mark A. Borges & Amy M. Knieriem, Mercer Human
Res. Consulting, New SEC Disclosure Rules Put Spotlight on Options Practices (Aug. 1,
2006), http://www.mercerhr.com/referencecontent.jhtml?idContent=1236340.
82. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 1.
83. Most outspoken in their efforts were the Council of Institutional Investors,
CalPERS, the New York City Pension Funds, and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and
Trust Funds. Borges & Knieriem, supra note 81.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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In July 2006, the SEC carried forth with its promise when it
adopted the final version of the new executive compensation
disclosure rules.86 The new rules are intended to remedy deficiencies
in the existing regulatory regime8 7 of equity option grants by explicitly
requiring line-item disclosure of grant dates, exercise prices, and
rationales surrounding the determination of stock option timing
patterns.88 The backdating provisions of the new regulations consist
of two fundamental components: tabular disclosure of backdated
options 89 and narrative discussion of executive option plans. 90
The new tabular disclosure requirements mandate that option
grants be disclosed in a summary compensation table designed to
provide shareholders with a more accurate assessment of the value of
executive option packages at the time the options are issued. 91 These
tabular disclosures will include the date on which the option grant is
awarded,' presumably creating a deterrent to abusive backdating
practices. 93
Moreover, in cases where the exercise price of a
particular grant is less than the fair market value of the underlying
security, the new regulations require that companies create a
separate, adjoining column on the summary compensation table that
86. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158
(Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274).
87. Existing securities laws prohibit publicly traded companies from making material
misrepresentations of stock option grant dates. Moreover, SEC regulations require that
companies disclose any material information that might further clarify, or prevent
misunderstandings of other disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2006).
88. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,16364.
89. Id. at 53,163 ("As proposed and adopted, grants of stock options will be disclosed
in the Summary Compensation Table at their fair value on the date of the grant.").
90. See id. at 53,162-63 ("Companies will also be required to address matters relating
to executives' option compensation in the new Compensation Discussion and Analysis
section, particularly as they relate to the timing and pricing of stock option grants."). For
a highly generalized discussion of each of the components, see HAMILTON, supra note 36,
at 80.
91. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,163
(noting that the disclosure of option grants in a summary compensation table "will give
shareholders an accurate picture of the value of options at the time they are actually
granted to the highest-paid executive officers").
92. Id. ("A separate table including disclosure of equity awards.., requires disclosure
of the grant date ... [which] is generally considered the day the decision is made to award
the option as long as recipients of the award are notified promptly."). Even in cases where
the exercise price of the grant is tied to the fair market value of an earlier date, the actual
grant date does not change. See id.
93. Id. at 53,162 ("The Commission acknowledged the importance to investors of
proper disclosure of executives' option compensation throughout the Proposing Release
.... The disclosure we proposed in January, along with related disclosure we also adopt
today, should provide investors with more information about option compensation.").
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would indicate the fair market value of the security on the date the
grant was issued.

4

These summary compensation

tables are

considered by the SEC to be the primary means of disclosure with
regards to executive pay packages.95 Through these tabular disclosure

requirements, the SEC intends to facilitate shareholder
understanding of "the extent and magnitude to which an executive's
previously awarded options provide the potential to generate upside
96
growth in the value" of the underlying security.
Aside from tabular disclosure requirements, "[c]ompanies will
also be required to address matters relating to executives' option

compensation in the new Compensation Discussion and Analysis
section, particularly as they relate to the timing and pricing of stock
option grants."9 7

As part of the new regulations, the SEC has

provided a nonexhaustive list of queries that might be addressed in a
company's disclosures.98 For example, companies choosing to award

stock options with an exercise price below that of the security's fair
market value on the grant date might be required to disclose the

94. Id. at 53,163 ("If the exercise price is less than the closing market price of the
underlying security on the date of the grant, a separate, adjoining column would have to
be added to this table showing that market price on the date of the grant."). In the event
that the date of the option grant differs from the date on which the compensation
committee or board of directors actually granted the options, then a separate adjoining
column would be added that states the date on which the committee or board actually
granted the option award. See id. Moreover, in the event that the exercise or strike price
of a particular grant is not the same as the market price of the underlying security on the
day of the grant, then the new tabular disclosure requirements require a description of the
methodology the committee or board use to ascertain the price at which the option could
be exercised. See id.
95. HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 17 (recognizing that prior SEC rules "permitted the
omission of too much information," whereas the new summary compensation tables are
intended as "the principal disclosure vehicle for executive compensation").
96. Id. at 18.
97. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,163.
The regulation also requires that,
[i]f the company had since the beginning of the
during the current fiscal year, a program, plan
dates for executive officers in coordination with
information, the company should disclose that
and Analysis section.

last fiscal year, or intends to have
or practice to select option grant
the release of material non-public
in the Compensation Discussion

Id.
98. See id. at 53,164. For example, companies may be required to explain why stock
option grants are awarded on particular dates and what methods the company uses in
selecting the terms and exercise price of executive option awards. See HAMILTON, supra
note 36, at 81.
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rationale employed in determining the exercise price.99 The SEC's
examples of proper disclosure clearly emphasize the necessity of
disclosing any material information relating to the timing of stock
option grants."l° Recognizing that "some companies may have a
program ... of awarding options ... based on the stock's price on a
date other than the actual grant date,"' 0' the SEC clarifies that such a
program would require absolute disclosure, both in the Executive
Compensation Summary Table and in the section dedicated to
Compensation Discussion and Analysis.0 2
For other matters
however, the nonexhaustive nature of the SEC's generalized
examples of proper disclosure ultimately leave companies to consider
their own facts and circumstances in determining the breadth of their
new disclosure obligations. 3

SEC Chairman Christopher Cox expects that these new
regulations will require new disclosures " 'to be written in plain
English so every investor can understand' " the compensation

schemes being utilized."° And while the overriding objective of these
regulations is to make executive compensation understandable to the
company's shareholders," the enhanced disclosure requirements will

99. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at
53,164 ("How does a program, plan or practice to time option grants to executives fit in
the context of the company's program, plan or practice, if any, with regard to option grants
to employees more generally?"). The SEC has provided several examples of the type of
information that companies might address in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis
section. For example, Item 402(b)(2)(iv) pertains to the method by which companies
determine the date of executive option grants. This particular provision was "included in
part to note that material information to be disclosed under Compensation Discussion and
Analysis may include the reasons a company selects particular grant dates" for stock
option awards. Id. at 53,163.
100. See id. (requiring the disclosure of compensation information "particularlyas [it]
relate[s] to the timing and pricing of stock option grants" (emphasis added)); HAMILTON,
supra note 36, at 81-82.
101. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,164.
102. Id. ("Such a program, plan or practice would ... require disclosure, including, as
appropriate, in the tables ... and in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section.
Again ... companies should consider their own facts and circumstances and include all
relevant material information in their corresponding disclosures."); HAMILTON, supra
note 36, at 83.
103. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at
53,163.
104. ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting Chairman Cox); Cox, supra note
13, at 4; see Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at
53,208 ("We are adopting as proposed a requirement that most of the disclosure ... be
provided in plain English.").
105. Cox, supra note 13, at 2; Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure,
71 Fed. Reg. at 53,159 ("The amendments to the compensation disclosure rules are
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force companies to "make it clear whenever options are being
backdated, and ...will require an explanation of the reasons" for

granting an option below fair market value." By requiring both
quantitative and narrative disclosure of stock option components in
executive compensation packages, the new prophylactic disclosure
rules will virtually eviscerate abusive backdating practices.' 07 Some
believe that the new disclosure requirements with regard to
backdated options will "effectively slam[] the door shut on the easy
opportunities to get away with secretive option grants." 10 8
The praise levied by Chairman Cox represents only a small
sampling of the tremendously positive reception that the SEC has
garnered from the investment community with regard to the new
backdating disclosure provisions of the executive compensation
disclosure rules. 10 9 In fact, one would be hard pressed to discern any

mainstream criticism specific to the backdating disclosure provisions.
Despite the popular praise, however, there has been only minimal

discussion of whether the new backdating disclosure provisions
represent any meaningful departure from existing securities laws or

whether the provisions can successfully quell the abusive option
timing practices prevalent in corporate America. Although the
backdating provisions in the new rules mark an admirable attempt by

intended to provide investors with a clearer and more complete picture of compensation
to principal executive officers.").
106. Presumably, the Compensation Analysis and Discussion Section will include
information pertaining to various rationales for backdated options along with disclosures
regarding the role of management and other executives in determining the amount of
compensation. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 53,159.
107. See Cox, supra note 13, at 4.
108. Id. Outside of the SEC and other federal regulatory bodies, private trade groups
and business consulting entities have also heaped tremendous praise on the effectiveness
of the new disclosure rules. See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 16 (explaining that one large
trade group, in particular, would be extremely pleased with the new regulations despite
having voiced some concern when the initial rule proposal was released last January);
Kathleen Pender, Stricter Rules on Compensation Disclosure Adopted, S.F. CHRON., July
27, 2006, at C1 (citing the extraordinarily positive commentary on the new disclosure rules
from attorneys, institutional investors, and market analysts).
109. But see Narayanan et al., supra note 58 (manuscript at 4) (noting that the
"misdating of option grants has legal, economic, tax, and governance implications all of
which are detrimental to shareholders). In this Article, the authors address the economic
impact of backdated equity option grants. Although the authors' thesis does not
specifically deal with the propriety of the new disclosure regulations, the authors do
appear to criticize the disclosure rules for various deficiencies. See id. ("Disclosure of
misdating practices can lead to restatement of earnings as the camouflaged pay is
recognized as compensation expense. The reduced earnings can result in a downward
reassessment of shareholder value.").
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federal regulators to address public fury over the options backdating
scandal, the new requirements merely reaffirm existing disclosure
provisions already contained in the federal securities laws. Moreover,
by regulating only the disclosure of backdated options,"a° the SEC
appears to have sanctioned the actual practice of backdating stock

options-a practice which many commentators contend is unethical at
best and illegal at worst.11 1

Prior to the new executive compensation disclosure rules, the
practice of issuing undisclosed backdated option grants was illegal

and violated federal securities law." 2 Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act") broadly prohibits publicly
traded companies from making misleading statements or omitting
material information in their public disclosures.1 13 Moreover, Rules
12b-20,14 13a-l,115 and 13a-l, 1 6 all promulgated by the SEC pursuant

110. See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the SEC Open
Meeting (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/Speech/2006/spchO72606psa.htm.
According to Commissioner Atkins,
It is important that we provide investors with complete and clear disclosure about
Thus, in
compensation, regardless of the form that compensation takes ....
adopting clear disclosure guidance for options today, we are not telling companies
to use or not to use options or to dispense them in a particular way. We are simply
providing what we hope to be clear guidelines for disclosure in an area that may
not have had clear enough guidelines in the past.
Id.
111. For a more generalized discussion of the legality of backdating option grants, see
infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
112. See Narayanan et al., supra note 58 (manuscript at 13); see also John W. Schoen,
Corporate Fraud Alive and Well in U.S.: Despite Enron Verdict, Accounting Reforms,
White Collar Crime Thriving, MSNBC, May 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/1276573 (explaining that federal authorities were in the process of investigating
backdated options that were granted to certain corporate executives well before the
enactment of the new executive compensation disclosure rules); Colvin, supra note 66, at
53 (noting that even though backdating option grants may be legal in theory, as practiced,
backdating is "stealing, pure and simple" because "following the complicated rules would
largely eliminate the advantages" of backdating options in the first place).
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (stating that it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading").
114. See § 240.12b-20 ("In addition to the information expressly required to be
included in a statement or report, there shall be added such further material information,
if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made not misleading.").
115. See § 240.13a-1 ("Every issuer ... shall file an annual report on the appropriate
form authorized or prescribed therefore for each fiscal year after the last full fiscal year for
which financial statements were filed in its registration statement.").
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to their authority under the 1934 Act, contain similar provisions
requiring the full disclosure of any material information.117 Although

courts have not yet been afforded the specific opportunity to address
the legality of various option timing schemes," 8 the failure to disclose
backdated equity option packages appears certain to create material
inaccuracies in a company's public statements regarding their
executive compensation practices.119

Moreover, the fact that a

backdated option allows a company's executive to enjoy an
undisclosed financial windfall-while causing shareholders to incur an
unintended compensation expense-would be considered a material
fact that a company would have been required to publicly disclose

even before the promulgation of the new disclosure rules. 12 0

116. See § 240.13a-l1 ("[E]very registrant ... shall file a current report on Form 8-K
within the period specified in that form, unless substantially the same information as that
required by Form 8-K has been previously reported by the registrant.").
117. David H. Kistenbroker, Back-Dating Stock Options: An Overview, in STOCK
OPTION PRICING PRACTICES: WHAT YOU NEED To KNOW, supra note 55, at 83, 88.
Although there is no rigid formulation "for determining what information is 'material'...
a good guideline is whether or not a reasonable investor would attach significance to the
information in making an investment decision." BARTOS, supra note 14, at 210; see also
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that the materiality
of information depends upon whether a plaintiff can establish "a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important"). For an additional discussion
of "materiality" in terms of corporate disclosures, see HAZEN, supra note 14, at 487-89.
118. One federal district court has had the opportunity to address option backdating in
the specific context of an initial public offering and determined that a failure to disclose
backdated equity option grants constituted a material omission. See Primavera Investors
v. Liquidmetal Techs., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157 (M.D. Fla. 2005). In the SEC's
enforcement action against Brocade Communications, the Commission has urged the
court to allow relief pursuant to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See Complaint at 68-70, SEC v.
Reyes, No. 06-CV-4435 (N.D. Calif., July 20, 2006) ("By engaging in the conduct
described above, [the defendants] ... (a) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to
defraud; (b) made untrue statements of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
... and (c) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which operated or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons.").
119. Bruce G. Vanyo & Michael S. Weisman, Back-Dating Stock Options: An
Overview, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, at 623, 627-32
(Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2006); see also Paul H. Dawes & Kory Sorrell, Tools for the
Imperfect Instrument: Practical Advice for Investigating Stock Option Awards, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, supra, 641, 647 (contending
that undisclosed backdating may result in misleading public disclosures and SEC filings).
120. Vanyo & Weisman, supra note 119, at 626; see also Narayanan et al., supra note 58
(manuscript at 18) ("Even by very crude quantitative materiality benchmarks ...
misstated earnings would likely be material."); Kistenbroker, supra note 117, at 91 ("The
fact that the back-dating practice enabled the executive to enjoy an immediate paper gain,
while causing the issuer to incur a compensation-related expense, may be deemed a
material feature of the plan that a reasonable shareholder or investor would consider
important to an investment decision.").
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In its initial prosecution efforts, the Justice Department has
adopted a strikingly similar rationale, adamantly decrying the

illegality of surreptitious backdating practices, notwithstanding the
new SEC disclosure rules. 121 Fraudulent conduct involving option
timing practices is already being prosecuted under the criminal
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 122 specifically those provisions
pertaining to securities fraud, 113 the certification of false statements
filed with the SEC, 124 altering records subject to a federal
12 6
investigation,' 25 and the destruction of corporate audit records.
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, staking out the Justice

Department's position before the Senate Finance Committee,
contended that backdating practices invariably give rise to "false and

misleading reports and financial statements" and the subsequent
dissemination of "false and fraudulent information to the investing
public."'2 7 Even in cases where executive option plans have been
approved by shareholders, the failure to specifically report backdated

options "misrepresents the true nature of stock option plans and
executive compensation and thus, a company obtains shareholder
approval . . .under false pretenses.' 1 28 Some have even contended

that backdating option grants 29
is tantamount to the unlawful

embezzlement of corporate assets.
Ironically, even the SEC itself appears to have acknowledged the
illegality of undisclosed backdated options long before the enactment

of its most recent disclosure rules. 30

In the enforcement action

121. See McNulty, supra note 79, at 8 ("The practice of stock option backdating.., can
only be seen as a brazen abuse of corporate power to artificially inflate the salaries of
corporate wrongdoers at the expense of shareholders. By fraudulently backdating grants,
defendants evade significant accounting, disclosure and tax requirements ....).
122. Id. However, some backdating practices may have predated the implementation
of Sarbanes-Oxley, in which case the Justice Department would have to rely on
preexisting securities laws. See id.
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
124. See id. § 1350.
125. See id. § 1519.
126. See id. § 1520.
127. McNulty, supra note 79, at 3 (noting, as well, that existing federal securities laws
require corporations to accurately report executive compensation packages and accurately
describe the option plans for which they are seeking shareholder approval).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 3-4 ("Grants of backdated options contrary to the terms of shareholderapproved option compensation plans can also be considered an embezzlement of
corporate assets because the defendants are misappropriating shares of the company at an
unauthorized and discounted value.").
130. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Alexander, No. 06-CV-3844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006);
see also Kistenbroker, supra note 117, at 99 ("The disclosure and accounting issues raised
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against Comverse Technology, for example, the SEC claimed that the
backdating practices of top executives violated numerous provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.11 The SEC levied similar charges against Symbol Technologies
in 2004, alleging a litany of securities fraud violations after the
company was found to have ignored accepted protocols in accounting
for executive option grants. 3 2 According to the SEC's complaint, the

company's improper backdating practices led to the misstatement of
earnings and improper reductions in the company's corporate tax
liability. 133 In short, backdated option grants "by their nature... fall

within the parameters of the current standards for material
misrepresentation." 34 Consequently, the SEC's most recent efforts at
ensuring the disclosure of backdated options serve only as a

been in place since the
restatement of existing requirements that have
13 5

passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.
Despite the fact that the new disclosure rules fail to represent
any meaningful departure from the existing disclosure regime that
would prohibit undisclosed backdated options, the potential
In
ramifications of the new SEC rules cannot be overstated.
promulgating this "new" disclosure regime, the SEC declined to

comment on whether a company may have a valid business interest in
backdating option grants. 3 6 Instead, the SEC continued to rely on
by back-dating have already provided the bases for securities litigation filed against issuers
and executives.").
131. See Complaint at T 3-5, SEC v. Reyes, No. 06-CV-4435 (N.D. Calif. July 20,
2006) ("By falsifying the dates on which options were purportedly granted ... the
defendants, among other things, violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, falsified books and records, and caused Brocade to falsely report its financial
results.").
132. Thomsen, supra note 41, at 4 (statement of Linda Thomsen, Director, Division of
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) ("The complaint alleged that rather
than use the actual exercise date as defined by Symbol's option plans, [certain executives]
instituted, without board approval or public disclosure, a practice of using a more
advantageous date chosen from a 30-day 'look-back' period so as to reduce the cost of the
exercise to the executive.").
133. Id. at 4-5. The Department of Justice also commenced parallel criminal
proceedings against Symbol Technologies as well as their General Counsel, Leonard
Goldner. The criminal charges alleged that certain executives violated securities fraud
statutes through the practice of backdating equity option grants. Id.
134. Narayanan et al., supra note 58 (manuscript at 16).
135. See id.
136. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,163 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274)
("The Commission does not express a view as to whether or not a company may or may
not have valid and sufficient reasons for such timing of option grants, consistent with a
company's own business purposes.").
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principle-based disclosure, allowing companies to "consider their own
13 7
facts and circumstances ... in their corresponding disclosures.'
However, by failing to take a position on the practice of backdating
option grants, the SEC appears to have given its tacit acceptance of
this abusive and deceptive practice.
John Coffee, a renowned professor of securities law at Columbia
University, has argued that " '[b]ackdating is clearly a badge of
fraud.' "I" Indeed, there is compelling evidence that backdating
option grants, regardless of any disclosures, violates both state and
federal securities law.'39 Alan Dye, a securities expert at the law firm
of Hogan & Hartson, believes that misleading disclosures pertaining
to options backdating would constitute securities fraud, and that
companies failing to properly disclose backdated options will often
encounter a litany of accounting and taxation violations."4 As
practiced, backdating equity option grants is analytically
indistinguishable from the more ingenious, yet equally destructive,
tactics that were used to pillage the corporate coffers at Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco. 1
Within the SEC, however, there appears to be no consensus
regarding the legality of backdating, which would explain why the
new regulations require merely the disclosure of backdated options,
14 2
as opposed to providing for a blanket prohibition of the practice.
Former SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman recently stated her
belief that backdating options is " 'clearly illegal.' "143 Commissioner
Paul Atkins, on the other hand, was more conciliatory, noting that
" 'the mere fact that options were backdated does not mean that the
securities laws were violated.' "I' Instead, Commissioner Atkins
attributes the current backdating scandal to the lack of clear
guidelines'4 5 that were available to companies regarding their
46
disclosure obligations in this particular area.1
137. Id.
138. Vineeta Anandand & Laurence Arnold, Taking the Heat for Stock Options:
Executive Grants Under Investigation, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 26, 2006, at 21 (quoting

John Coffee of Columbia University).
139. Narayanan et al., supra note 58 (manuscript at 13).
140. Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 2005, at A4 (addressing the various legal issues generally arising from improper
backdating procedures).
141. Colvin, supra note 66, at 53.
142. Vinson & Elkins LLP, supra note 52.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Although the SEC attempted to clarify benefit disclosure policy through the
promulgation of the 1992 disclosure rules, shareholders and institutional investors
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While backdating practices are almost uniformly regarded as
ethically questionable, most commentators agree that the legality of a
company's actions will almost always turn on the manner in which the
company issued the options.'4 7 Generally, the practice of backdating
equity option grants does not give rise to criminal culpability'48 so
long as the backdated options are clearly communicated to corporate
shareholders and the costs of the backdated options are accurately
reflected in corporate earnings 4 9 and tax returns.'
Perhaps it was
this technical and largely abstract "legality" that was a contributing
factor in the SEC's decision to regulate only the disclosure of

backdated options as opposed to instituting an outright prohibition of
the practice. Unsurprisingly, however, the conditions under which
backdating may be legal are rarely satisfied.15 Adhering to the rules
above would eviscerate any potential benefit that a corporation might
perceive from backdating option grants in the first place. In fact, "if
continued to complain of the "incomprehensible" reporting of executive pay packages
even after the SEC's attempts at comprehensive reform. See Nathan Knutt, Executive
Compensation Regulation: CorporateAmerica, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 500
(2005).
146. Vinson & Elkins LLP, supra note 52.
147. Amanda Cantrell, More Than 100 Firms Probably Backdated Options, CNN
MONEY, July 12, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/12/technology/options.saga/index.
htm.
148. Vinson & Elkins LLP, supra note 52 ("[T]he mere fact that options were
backdated does not mean that the securities laws were violated."). The SEC and the
Department of Justice have committed to examining backdating cases on an individual
basis, challenging only those cases where corporate executives have been the beneficiaries
of slumping stock prices because of the retroactive timing of equity option grants. See id.
The decision to commence criminal or civil enforcement proceedings will depend
primarily on the corporation's disclosure of its option timing practices and whether the
company's accounting recognized the costs of these in-the-money option grants on
corporate earnings statements. See id.
149. The granting of backdated options is financially tantamount to the popular
practice of granting in-the-money options, and consequently, the reported earnings for the
fiscal year of the backdated option grants should be reduced commensurate with the
corporation's cost of issuing the options. Many companies have recently restated earnings
from past years as a result of their earlier failures to properly account for the backdated
grants. See Lie, supra note 71.
150. The exercise price of an equity option grant directly affects corporate
compensation expenses that are used for tax purposes, and also the capital gains taxes for
the recipient of the grant. Hence, a backdated option may alter the tax liability for both
the corporation and the executive alike. See id. For a specific discussion of the individual
tax consequences for executives receiving backdated option grants, see Mark Everson,
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Serv., Backdating of Stock Options and
Other Executive Compensation Issues: Remarks Before the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate 4-8 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/
2005test/090606testme.pdf. For a more general discussion regarding the legality of option
backdating, see McNulty, supra note 79, at 4-8.
151. Lie, supra note 42, at 804.
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these conditions hold, there is little reason to backdating options,
52
because the firm can simply grant in-the-money options instead.'
The backdating provisions of the executive compensation
disclosure rules also fail to address many of the fundamental
circumstances that give rise to backdated option grants in the first
place. Professor Lie contends that the abusive backdating of option
grants occurs, at least in part, because most equity option plans do not
explicitly prohibit the species of manipulation that comes with
backdating option grants. 5 3
Although option plans generally
mandate that the exercise price be equal to the market price of the
security on the day of the award, 54 these plans do not expressly
prohibit the grant date from preceding the date of the award. Even in
the wake of the executive compensation disclosure rules, company
option plans will still tacitly permit the backdating of option plans,
albeit with slightly more public disclosure. When combined with the
SEC's tacit acceptance of option backdating in the new disclosure
rules, executives may find themselves in a better position than ever
before to manipulate the timing of equity option grants.
Admittedly, the new backdating disclosure rules promulgated by
the SEC are a step in the right direction, if for no other reason than
the increased awareness of backdating practices that accompanied the
passage of the new disclosure rules.'5 5 However, the SEC should have
prohibited the deceptive practice altogether. Indeed, it is nearly
impossible to successfully advocate for the right of corporate
executives to retroactively backdate option grants at lower stock
prices, especially when other less deceptive means are readily
available to achieve the very same objectives. 5 6
Instead of

152. Id.
153. See id. at 807.
154. See id.
155. Professor Erik Lie, though supportive of the newest SEC executive compensation
disclosure rules, contends that abusive option practices will be greatly curtailed if for any
other reason than " 'because of the media focus and the consequences the companies
face.' " Pender, supra note 108. Previously, Lie believed that corporate executives were
simply " 'thinking they would get away with [backdating]. Now they're recognizing they
won't get away with it.' " Id.
156. See Lie, supra note 42, at 804 (contending that corporate executives could realize
all the benefits of backdated options, except for nondisclosure, by simply increasing "the
value of the award by either awarding more options or awarding options with an exercise
price lower than the market price at the award date [i.e. discounted stock options]").
However, Paul Dorf, the managing director at Compensation Resources, Inc., offers
several explanations for why corporations are hesitant to issue larger option grants or
discounted options in lieu of engaging in deceptive backdating:
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backdating options, a corporation might just as easily increase the
value of an equity option award simply by granting traditional
discounted stock options. Indeed, it is difficult to discern any
legitimate benefit to backdating options that cannot be likewise
obtained from granting less deceptive, discounted stock options.
Ever since the promulgation of comprehensive federal securities
laws in the early 1930s,57 the SEC has largely adhered to a strict

disclosure-based regime, 58 whereby publicly traded companies are
required to disclose material information. 15 9

In similar fashion,

First, the number of options awarded is often determined by past awards and/or
industry norms. Second, the stock option plan limits the number of options that
can be awarded. Third, stockholders dislike the potential dilutive effect generated
by a large number of outstanding options. Fourth, accounting rules require a
charge to earnings for grants that are issued in-the-money. Fifth, stockholders are
averse to the notion of issuing options "at a discount" to executives.
Id. at 804. Despite these plausible explanations, the detriments associated with issuing
discounted options pale in comparison to the potential liability that shareholders face
when executives choose to backdate their option awards.
157. The federal regulation of securities began as a response to the stock market crash
of 1929. See Jonathan Z. Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable Expansion of
Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 335, 336 (1994). Prior to the enactment of these
regulations, American financial institutions were awash in corruption and disarray. See
Jon Canfield, The Evolution of a More StringentBusiness Judgment Rule in Banking-The
Minimalization of Director Deference, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 153, 160 (2006). Adverse
economic conditions and rampant speculation led to the demise of more than 9000
commercial banks by 1933, at which point Congress undertook two comprehensive
legislative efforts aimed at restoring order to American capital markets. See id. The
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 continue to represent the
primary governing body of federal regulatory authority pertaining to the issuing and sale
of publicly traded securities. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000). The 1933 Act has been characterized as the
first consumer protection law implemented by Congress and is generally thought to have
been "a great success in balancing the needs of investors and the public generally against
the desire to maintain free and efficient markets." HAZEN, supra note 14, at 21-22. The
1934 Act is significantly broader in scope than the 1933 Act and governs the everyday
transactions in capital markets. For a highly comprehensive discussion of the 1934 Act,
see id. at 326-57.
158. The disclosure regime has its origins in English corporate law and was adopted in
the United States with the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which promoted the public
disclosure of material information with respect to companies that traded securities on the
capital market. See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 2 (2d ed. 2002). However, federal securities laws have always maintained at least
some component of substantive rulemaking that prohibits certain corporate governance
practices. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act contains antibribery provisions
as well as certain record-keeping requirements that publicly traded corporations are
required to follow. See id. at 196-97.
159. See Jason Michael Craft, What's All the Commotion?: An Examination of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 119, 122-24
(2005); Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW &
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rulemaking, instead opting for a system of full disclosure that allows
investors the opportunity to evaluate the merits of a company's
actions."6 The executive compensation disclosure rules, as the name

implies, continue the SEC's long legacy of focusing on the disclosure
of information as opposed to substantive rulemaking. 6 ' The SEC and

federal regulators generally justify the disclosure regime as the most
efficient method of ensuring that investors do not make poor
decisions as a result of being uninformed. 6 ' This level of government
involvement falls between the extremes of "mere prevention of fraud

under criminal law and passing on the merits of an investment, as can
be the case under state law."' 63 For nearly the entirety of its history,
the SEC has adopted the position first articulated by Louis Brandeis,

that "the prospect of disclosure of certain information deter[s]
unethical behavior ... [and that the] disclosure of material facts [can
remedy] social and industrial diseases. ' 164
Most likely, this very same rationale at least partially explains the
SEC's hesitancy to promulgate a substantive rule prohibiting the
practice of backdating equity option grants. 65 However, the SEC's
reliance on its oft-proclaimed disclosure regime has fallen by the
wayside in the wake of unprecedented corporate meltdowns and the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002."6
Unlike prior efforts at
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 113-14 (1999); Peter L. Cholakis, Comment, Company Disclosure
of EarningsProjections: Should IndividualInvestors Be Allowed Into the "Ball Park"?, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 819,824 (1999).
160. HAZEN, supra note 14, at 22 ("It is a basic tenet of federal securities regulation
that investors' ability to make their own evaluations of available investments obviates any
need that some observers may perceive for the more costly and time-consuming
governmental merit analysis of the securities being offered.").
161. See HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 79 (clarifying that the SEC does not seek to
encourage or discourage the use of backdated stock options, so long as companies provide
"full and fair disclosure of compensation information to the extent material or required by
Commission rule").
162. See Craft, supra note 159, at 122-24; Fox, supra note 159, at 113-14.
163. BARTOS, supra note 14, at 2.

164. In his famous book, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, Brandeis
declared that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman."

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE

BANKERS USE IT 62 (1914). See also BARTOS, supra note 14, at 1-2 ("Potential investors
are assumed to be capable of making their own investment decisions when they have at
their disposal sufficient information concerning the issuer and the issued securities.").
165. Interview with Thomas L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Law, Univ. of
N.C., in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 10, 2006).
166. Although the preamble to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that the purpose of the
legislation is to "protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures," the practical effect of the legislation was the creation of substantive
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regulating corporate conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley was unprecedented in
its breadth,'67 directing the SEC to promulgate an array of substantive
regulations"68 designed to "increase the transparency, integrity, and

accountability of public companies."169 In hindsight, Sarbanes-Oxley
marked the onset of a reactionary era in securities regulation, where
Congress, along with the SEC, served notice on the investment
community that the complacent ethical environment shrouding the
1990s would no longer be tolerated.17 °

Although Sarbanes-Oxley

certainly contains a wide array of disclosure provisions, "the clear
171
thrust of [the legislation] is to improve corporate governance.
Many commentators believe that Sarbanes-Oxley "goes further than
any of the earlier securities laws ...in dealing directly with corporate
governance," perhaps evidencing a new era of substantive securities
regulation focusing more on corporate governance practices and less
1 72
on principle-based disclosure.

To ensure adequate enforcement of its new mandate from
Congress, the SEC was also given significant power in administering
substantive issues of corporate governance. 171 In the spirit of
Sarbanes-Oxley, contemporary corporate practices, such as options
backdating, call for the same aggressive and substantive regulation
used to eliminate abusive corporate excesses in the wake of Enron
and related scandals. The deceptiveness of backdating equity option

grants requires the SEC to prohibit backdating practices altogether,
prohibitions on certain types of corporate behavior. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.). For a discussion of many of these substantive measures, see J. Brent Wilkins, The
Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring ShareholderConfidence, 29 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 339, 345-46 (2005).
167. See Note, The Good, The Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2123 (2003).
168. Perhaps the most glaring substantive prohibition contained in Sarbanes-Oxley is
the blanket prohibition on personal loans to corporate executives. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. II 2002). For a comprehensive discussion of
the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley directly pertaining to the loan practices of corporate
boards, see HAZEN, supra note 14, at 351.
169. Note, supra note 167, at 2123.
170. David H. Kistenbroker et al., Criminaland Civil Investigations: United States v.
Stein and Related Issues, in STOCK OPTION PRICING PRACTICES: WHAT YOU NEED To
KNOW, supra note 55, at 401,405.
171. HAZEN, supra note 14, at 26.
172. See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (discussing the specific provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that
deal with substantive matters of corporate governance).
173. Id. at 800-01 (noting, however, "that Sarbanes-Oxley could be the beginning of a
sea of change by focusing federal law more and more on corporate governance and other
areas of corporate law that have traditionally been left to the states").
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as opposed to merely reaffirming existing securities laws by
mandating their disclosure.
Perhaps most puzzling is the fact that the SEC already possesses

the regulatory authority to create an outright prohibition on
backdating options. 74
Congress extended extraordinarily broad
regulatory authority to the SEC in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.'75 This

particular section of the 1934 Act is one of the broadest statutes on
record, providing a "long-arm provision" with which the SEC is
permitted to regulate or prohibit a wide range of potentially
destructive conduct. 76 In enacting § 10(b), Congress manifested its

intent to protect the investment community from any "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance" associated with the sale of
securities."77
The only incentive that companies possess for
backdating an option award is to disguise an in-the-money option by
making it appear as though the grant was issued at-the-money. 78 "At
the very least there is intent to deceive as to the grant date of the
option. ' 179
Certainly, protecting shareholders from deceptive
backdating practices constitutes the very species of "manipulative or
deceptive" behavior that Congress has directed the SEC to regulate.
Recognizing the deficiencies of the new disclosure rules and the
existing federal securities regime, some activist shareholders and
public pension funds are not waiting idly for government-sponsored
solutions to the backdating epidemic. 8 ° Hundreds of derivative and
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
175. See HAZEN, supra note 14, at 326. The extraordinarily broad scope of the 1934
Act serves as a contrast to the 1933 Act which focuses almost exclusively on the sale and
purchase of securities. See id. The 1934 Act has "a much broader focus both with regard
to transactions in securities and also with respect to regulation of the markets and the
securities industry." Id.
176. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990). Pursuant to the congressional authoring
granted by § 10(b), the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5, which is largely coextensive with the
original statute passed in the 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
177. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person ...(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 ("It shall be unlawful ... to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud
...or ...engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.").
178. Narayanan et al., supra note 58 (manuscript at 22).
179. Id.
180. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and the
Minnesota Board of Investment have already opposed the reelection of two directors on
the board of UnitedHealth, and the Council of Institutional Investors has sent letters to a
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class action lawsuits have already been filed, alleging violations of a
wide array of federal and state securities laws.' 81 Other groups have
taken a different approach, expressing their intention to file
shareholder proposals that would either mandate enhanced disclosure
of equity option awards that go well beyond the requirements set
forth in the new SEC disclosure rules or prohibit abusive option
timing practices altogether. 182
Shareholders and institutional
investors would be well advised to propose stringent internal
restrictions or outright prohibitions on backdating option grants, as
opposed to accepting the new SEC regulations as a conclusive remedy
to abusive option timing practices.
Other related shareholder proposals also have the potential to
favorably complement existing federal securities regulations.
Proposals that encourage executive compensation committees to
adopt fixed grant dates for option packages will almost certainly
succeed in alleviating any specter of timing improprieties, as would
proposals mandating the immediate disclosure of option awards, as
opposed to waiting the two business days permitted under SarbanesOxley.'83
Slightly less effective, though nevertheless desirable
proposals would include those that prohibit directors from granting
option awards when executives possess material corporate
information
that is likely to favorably influence corporate stock
prices.' 1 4
The scandal surrounding the backdating of stock options is only
"the latest reminder that the boards at many U.S. companies still
have much work to do to ensure that stock-options align the
interests" of shareholders and management. 85 Continued reminders
of abusive option timing practices plague Wall Street with the coming
of each new business day, as more lawsuits are filed, more companies
disclose option timing irregularities, and more financial results are
restated.18 6 Although the precise outlook remains unclear, 2007 may
very well bring additional restatements, investigations, and
multitude of companies requesting an explanation of any company policies pertaining to
the timing of option grants and other executive compensation practices. ALLEN &
MISHRA, supra note 5, at 5.
181. See Vinson & Elkins LLP, supra note 52.
182. See ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 5.
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(4) (Supp. III 2003) (requiring that changes in beneficial
ownership must be filed with the SEC by the end of the second business day after the day
of execution of the transaction).
184. See ALLEN & MISHRA, supra note 5, at 6.
185. Id.
186. Gordon, supra note 77.
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indictments.187 And while the SEC's new backdating disclosure
requirements represent an admirable attempt at quelling the
backdating controversy, it is unlikely that the executive compensation
disclosure rules will impose any new requirements for backdated
options that were not already in place under existing federal securities
laws.
As equity option plans continue to form the centerpiece of
executive compensation packages, it is more important than ever that
the SEC remain vigilant in combating abusive corporate practices
that victimize American investors.
The newest executive
compensation disclosure rules fail to demonstrate a concerted
commitment by the SEC to protect shareholders from illegal option
timing practices. Indeed, corporate executives may find themselves in
an even more favorable position after the new disclosure rules in
terms of their ability to backdate option grants. The SEC's conscious
decision to require only the disclosure of backdated option grants, as
opposed to providing a blanket prohibition of such practices, serves
as a tacit indication that the SEC accepts backdating as a legitimate
practice. In the future, the SEC should instead directly address the
manipulative timing of option grants by banning deceptive practices
that serve no legitimate purpose other than to disguise executive
compensation grants. 88
JOHN D. SHIPMAN

187. Id.
188. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. The practice of granting
discounted equity option packages provides corporations with the same benefits as those
derived from backdated options, simply in a less deceptive format.

